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A RECONSIDERATION OF HAITIAN
CLAIMS FOR WITHHOLDING OF
REMOVAL UNDER THE CONVENTION
AGAINST TORTURE
Henry Mascia
I. INTRODUCTION
As they brought Jacque' to the National Penitentiary in
Port-au-Prince, his stomach dropped, and his heart skipped a
beat. After spending only two days in the prison, he discovered
that the conditions were worse than he had thought. They had
forced him to stay in this 25' by 15' by 15' cell with forty other
men. Because there were no toilets, he had to defecate in a bag
and dump it out of the window. He got no sleep the first night
because the wind blew the stench of fecal matter into his cell
causing him to throw up the paltry portion of rice and beans
they had given him the day before. During the moments when
his body adjusted to the stench, he began to doze off, but the
bites from rats, with whom he also shared this cell, disturbed
even these short moments of rest. The next day, they served
him only one meal of rice and beans again. Jacque became over-
whelmed at the thought of spending even another minute this
way. His lawyer told him that the Haitian authorities would
release him if a member of Jacque's immediate family in Haiti
agreed to take responsibility for him. Although he was born in
Haiti, he came to the United States with his entire family when
he was just a boy; so, there was nobody to sponsor him.
1 Jacque is a fictional character, but his experience is based on the actual
conditions in the National Penitentiary in Port-au-Prince, where criminal depor-
tees from the United States are held indefinitely.
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Jacque could not take it anymore. He had to ask the
guards for more food; otherwise, he would die of hunger. The
other deportees warned him not to complain, but desperation
clouded his judgment. The guards assumed that, as a criminal
deportee from the United States, Jacque was just trying to start
trouble and decided to teach him a lesson. They brought him
out of the cell and struck him repeatedly with a metal rod. As
the blows reigned down on his back, he could not help recalling
the words of his lawyers: "I am sorry Jacque. The judges ruled
that the conditions in the Haitian prisons do not constitute tor-
ture." If this is not "torture," he wondered, then what is?
Some immigrants in removal proceedings are eligible for
Withholding of Removal under the Convention against Torture
and Other Cruel and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Pun-
ishment ("Convention against Torture").2 The United States
signed the Convention against Torture on April 18, 1988. 3 On
October 21, 1994, the Senate ratified the treaty,4 conditioning
its advice and consent on one declaration, two reservations, and
five understandings. 5 These understandings were incorporated
into the implementing regulations, which became effective on
March 22, 1999.6 The implementing regulations provide that
the removal of an individual will be withheld if the applicant
demonstrates that "it is more likely than not that he or she
would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of re-
moval."7 The regulations define torture as:
[a]ny act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or
mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as
obtaining from him or her or a third person information or a con-
2 Withholding of removal under section 241(b)(3)(B) of the Act and withhold-
ing of removal under the Convention Against Torture, 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2)
(2006).
3 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel and Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, pmbl., Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into
force June 26, 1987), available at http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishin-
ternetbible/partl/chapterIV/treatyl4.asp [hereinafter Convention against
Torture].
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 Regulations Concerning the Convention Against Torture, 64 Fed. Reg.
8478, 8478 (Feb. 19, 1999) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 3, 103, 208, 235, 238, 240,
241, 253, 507).
7 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2).
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fession, punishing him or her for an act he or she or a third person
has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidat-
ing or coercing him or her or a third person, or for any reason
based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering
is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acqui-
escence of a public official or other person acting in an official
capacity.8
The regulations also state that "[i]n order to constitute torture,
an act must be specifically intended to inflict severe physical or
mental pain or suffering. An act that results in unanticipated
or unintended severity of pain and suffering is not torture."9
U.S. Courts have interpreted the definition of torture to
contain five elements:
(1) an act causing severe physical or mental pain or suffering; (2)
intentionally inflicted; (3) for a proscribed purpose; (4) by or at the
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public offi-
cial who has custody or physical control of the victim; and (5) not
arising from lawful sanctions.10
Courts have interpreted the requirement that a given act
must be "intentionally inflicted" to constitute torture in a vari-
ety of ways. Nevertheless, the predominant interpretation is
that the regulations create a specific intent requirement.',
The critical issue in many petitions for withholding of re-
moval under the Convention against Torture is whether the
treatment that the immigrant will suffer amounts to the statu-
tory definition of torture.12 Courts have been reluctant to ex-
tend this form of relief to criminal deportees, like Jacque, who
are in danger of being detained indefinitely in Haitian
prisons.1 3
8 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1) (emphasis added).
9 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(5).
10 In re J-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 291, 297 (BIA 2002).
11 See Francois v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 645, 651 (3d Cir. 2006) (relying on Au-
guste v. Ridge, 395 F.3d 123 (3d Cir. 2005)); Auguste v. Ridge, 395 F.3d 123, 148
(3d Cir. 2005); Cadet v. Bulger, 377 F.3d 1173, 1191 (11th Cir. 2004); In re J-E-, 23
I. & N. Dec. 291, 301 (BIA 2002).
12 See generally, e.g., Auguste, 395 F.3d at 123; Zubeda v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d
463 (3d Cir. 2003); Thelemaque v. Ashcroft, 363 F. Supp. 2d 198 (D. Conn. 2005);
In re J-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 291 (BIA 2002).
13 See generally, e.g., Toussaint v. Attorney General, 455 F.3d 409 (3d Cir.
2006); Francois, 448 F.3d 645; Auguste, 395 F.3d 123; Thelemaque, 363 F. Supp. 2d
198.
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This Comment sets forth three major contentions. First, a
general intent should satisfy the "intentionally inflicted" re-
quirement of 8 C.F.R. § 208.18. Second, the analytical frame-
work courts have used is flawed because it does not accurately
reflect the concept of specific intent as it is understood in the
criminal context. Third, Haitian authorities specifically intend
to inflict severe pain and suffering on criminal deportees as a
result of the widespread fear of and prejudice against them.
Therefore, the conditions in Haitian prisons satisfy the regula-
tory definition of "torture."
The second Part of this Comment will recount the history of
non-refoulement as a doctrine. The third Part of this Comment
will review the history of the Convention against Torture. The
fourth Part of this Comment will discuss the statutory and reg-
ulatory implementation of the Convention against Torture. The
fifth Part of this Comment will examine how U.S. courts and
administrative agencies have interpreted the "intentionally in-
flicted" requirement. The sixth and final Part of this Comment
will argue that general intent should be enough to satisfy the
requisite intent element for Withholding of Removal under the
Convention against Torture, set forth a new analytical frame-
work using the specific intent standard, and, finally, demon-
strate how the specific intent doctrine has been misapplied to
prison conditions in Haiti.
II. BACKGROUND ON REFUGEES AND REFOULEMENT
A. Beginnings of "non-refoulement"
The term "non-refoulement" is derived from the French
word "refouler" meaning "to drive back."14 Before the early to
mid-nineteenth century, "formal agreements between states for
the reciprocal surrender of subversives, dissidents, and traitors"
controlled a state's policy toward refugees. 15 However, popular
support grew for those "fleeing their own country for political
reasons."'16 In 1933, Article 3 of the 1933 Convention Relating
to the International Status of Refugees (the "1933 Convention")
14 Guy S. GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 69 (Oxford
Clarendon Press 1996) (1983).
15 Id.
16 Id. at 70.
[Vol. 19:287
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol19/iss2/6
THE CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE
set forth the idea of non-refoulement for the first time.17 The
relevant portion of Article 3 reads:
Each of the Contracting Parties undertakes not to remove or
keep from its territory by application of police measures, such as
expulsions or non-admittance at the frontier (refoulement), refu-
gees who have been authorised to reside there regularly, unless
the said measures are dictated by reasons of national security or
public order.18
The 1933 Convention, while laying the ground work for ref-
ugee law today, 19 had a narrow scope, as it only applied to "Rus-
sian, Armenian and assimilated refugees" 20 and was only
signed by eight States. 2' Future conventions and agreements
would have a much wider scope. 22
B. 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
1. Scope
The principle of non-refoulement set forth in Article 33 of
the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (herein-
after "1951 Convention") has served "both as a model and a tex-
tual basis for many subsequent human rights treaties that have
incorporated the principle of non-refoulement. ''23 Article 33
reads:
1. No Contracting State shall expel or return ("refouler") a refu-
gee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where
his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion.
17 Convention relating to the International Status of Refugees, art. III, Oct.
18, 1933, 159 L.N.T.S. 199, 205 (entered into force July 26, 1935) [hereinafter 1933
Convention]; David Weissbrodt & Isabel Hortreiter, The Principle of Non-Refoule-
ment: Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment in Comparison with the Non-Refoulement
Provisions of Other International Human Rights Treaties, 5 BUFF. HUM. RTs. L.
REV. 1, 2 (1999).
18 1993 Convention, supra note 17, at 205.
19 Weissbrodt & Hbrtreiter, supra note 17, at 2.
20 1933 Convention, supra note 17, at 203.
21 GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 14, at 71. Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Egypt,
France, Italy, Norway and Czechoslovakia were the only signatories. 1933 Con-
vention, supra note 17, at 201, 203.
22 See Conventions cited infra notes 24, 34.
23 Weissbrodt & Hortreiter, supra note 17, at 2.
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2. The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be
claimed by a refugee [sic] whom there are reasonable grounds for
regarding as a danger to the security of the country in which he is,
or who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particu-
larly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that
country. 24
Article 33 of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refu-
gees sets forth much broader protection than any other previous
agreement. 25 Contrary to previous agreements, which were de-
signed for specific humanitarian crises, this agreement applied
generally to all those who fit the definition of a "refugee,"26 de-
fined as anyone who had:
[a] well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, relig-
ion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or politi-
cal opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable
or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protec-
tion of that country; [or who, not having a nationality and being
outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of
such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to re-
turn to it]. 2 7
In addition, the 1951 Convention was much more widely ac-
cepted than previous agreements, as demonstrated by the fact
that, as of 1999, one hundred and thirty-two states had signed
onto the agreement. 28 Finally, the 1951 Convention applies not
only to any refugees facing the threat of torture, but also to
those who face the threat of persecution. 29 A person suffers per-
secution when "his life or freedom would be threatened." 30
24 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 33, July 28, 1951, 176
U.N.T.S. 2545 (entered into force April 22, 1954) (official text in English and
French) [hereinafter 1951 Convention].
25 See Weissbrodt & Hbrtreiter, supra note 17, at 18.
26 Id.
27 Weissbrodt & Hortreiter, supra note 17, at 18 (quoting Convention Relating
to the Status of Refugees, art. 1A, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 2545 (entered into
force April 22, 1954) (official text in English and French)). The United States
adopted a functionally equivalent definition of refugees in the Refugee Act of 1980.
See 8 U.S.C.A. §1101(A)(42)(A) (WEST 2006).
28 See Weissbrodt & Hortreiter, supra note 17, at 18.
29 See id.
30 See 1933 Convention, supra note 18, art. 3; Weissbrodt & Hortreiter, supra
note 17, at 21.
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2. Exception
Despite the expanded scope of protection that the 1951
Convention provided refugees against refoulement, a signatory
could still return a refugee with a well-founded fear on account
of a protected ground if the refugee "committed a serious non-
political crime outside the country of refuge prior to his admis-
sion to that country as a refugee."31 The 1951 Convention fur-
ther provided that:
[tihe benefit of the present provision may not, however, be
claimed by a refugee [sic] whom there are reasonable grounds for
regarding as a danger to the security of the country in which he is,
or who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particu-
larly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that
country.32
These provisions reflect another principle of refoulement - a
country need not put its own security in danger to accept a refu-
gee. The principles of non-refoulement in the 1951 Conven-
tion33 and the subsequent Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees (1967) ("1967 Protocol") 34 laid the foundation for the
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or De-
grading Treatment or Punishment ("Convention against Tor-
ture" or "CAT"). 35
III. CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE
A. History of the Convention
The Convention against Torture was signed to "make more
effective the struggle against torture and other cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment throughout the world. '36
Adopted on December 10, 1984,37 opened for signature on Feb-
ruary 4, 1985,3s and entered into force on June 26, 1987,39 the
31 1951 Convention, supra note 24, art. 1F(b), at 156.
32 1951 Convention, supra note 24, art. 33(2), at 176.
33 See 1951 Convention, supra note 24.
34 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267
(entered into force Oct. 4, 1967) [hereinafter 1967 Protocol].
35 See Convention against Torture, supra note 3; see also Weissbrodt & Hr-
treiter, supra note 17, at 2.
36 Convention against Torture, supra note 3, pmbl.
37 Id.
38 Zubeda v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 463, 471 (3d Cir. 2003).
20071
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United States signed the Convention against Torture on April
18, 1988.40 It was referred to the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations May 23, 1988,'4 1 and ratified by the Senate on October
27, 1990.42 It became binding on the United States in 1994
when the President delivered the ratifying documents to the
United Nations. 43 Today, one hundred and thirteen States are
signatories to the Convention against Torture. 44
B. Non-refoulement policy, Article 3
The Convention against Torture is based principally on Ar-
ticle 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Arti-
cle 7 of the Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, 45 both of
which are based on the fundamental principles of the 1975 Dec-
laration against Torture. 46 However, the principle of non-
refoulement in the Convention against Torture does not have an
analogous provision in the 1975 Declaration against Torture.47
Rather, the principles in the Convention against Torture have
their roots in the case law of the European Convention against
Human Rights.48 The principle of non-refoulement under Arti-
cle 3 of the Convention against Torture provides a much nar-
rower scope of protection, as it protects only refugees in danger
of being subjected to torture,49 "one of the most severe forms of
persecution."50 The Convention against Torture defines torture
as:
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or
mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as
obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession,
punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is
suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or
a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any
39 Convention against Torture, supra note 3, pmbl.
40 See Zubeda, 333 F.3d at 471.
41 Convention against Torture, supra note 3, pmbl.
42 136 CONG. REC. S17, 486-501 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990).
43 Zubeda, 333 F.3d at 471.
44 Weissbrodt & Hortreiter, supra note 17, at 6.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Convention against Torture, supra note 3, art. 3.
50 Weissbrodt & Hortreiter, supra note 17, at 16.
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kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instiga-
tion of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or
other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain
or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful
sanctions.51
This narrow application is warranted because the Conven-
tion against Torture does not allow a state to return a refugee
that could be a danger to society, as provided for in previous
agreements with a broader scope of protection, such as the 1933
Agreement and the 1951 Agreement. 52
C. Senate's advice and consent
The U.S. Constitution gives the President the power to
make treaties, with the advice and consent of the Senate. 53 On
May 10, 1988, President Reagan referred the Convention
against Torture to the Committee on Foreign Relations, 54 ac-
companied by a letter from the Department of State outlining
the background of the Convention against Torture and recom-
mending various conditions for the Senate to adopt.55 President
George H. W. Bush, concerned that President Reagan's package
"faced substantial opposition from human rights groups and
other interested parties," sent a revised package of conditions. 56
The Senate ratified the Convention against Torture,5 7 and at-
tached several reservations, understandings, declarations and
provisos (collectively "Conditions") because "it was not possible
to negotiate a treaty that was acceptable to the United States in
all respects."58
For the purpose of this Comment's focus on non-refoule-
ment, the most relevant Condition is the first understanding
which states "[t]hat with reference to Article 1, the United
States understands that, in order to constitute torture, an act
must be specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental
51 Convention against Torture, supra note 3, art. 1.
52 See supra Part II.B.2.
53 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, c. 2.
54 Convention against Torture, supra note 3, pmbl.
55 See id.
56 REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, S. ExEc. Doc. No. 30,
at App. A (1990).
57 See supra Part III.A.
58 Convention against Torture, supra note 3, pmbl.
20071
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pain or suffering. . . -59 This understanding differs from the
actual provision of Article 1 of the Convention against Torture,
which provides that torture is "any act by which severe pain or
suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted
on a person . . ."60 This understanding by the United States,
despite President Bush's efforts, drew criticism from some
members of the international community. The Netherlands, in
an objection dated February 26, 1996, stated, "[tihe Govern-
ment of the Kingdom of the Netherlands considers the following
understandings to have no impact on the obligations of the
United States of America under the Convention: II. 1 (a) This
understanding appears to restrict the scope of the definition of
torture under Article 1 of the Convention."61
IV. INCORPORATION OF THE CONVENTION AGAINST
TORTURE INTO U.S. LAW
A. Statutory and Regulatory Implementation
Because the Convention against Torture is not self-execut-
ing, according to the Senate's final condition, 62 the United
States passed various statutes and regulations to implement
the provisions of the treaty, taking into account the Senate's
conditions. 63 On October 21, 1998, Congress passed the Foreign
Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act, which ordered the heads
of the appropriate agencies to prescribe regulations implement-
ing Article 3 of the Convention against Torture.64
Accordingly, on February 19, 1999, the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS), at the time a division of the De-
partment of Justice (the Department of Homeland Security took
over operations of the INS in 2002), set forth the interim rule
59 Id., Declarations and Reservations of the U.S. (emphasis added).
60 Id., art. 1.
61 Id., Declarations and Reservations of the U.S.
62 Id. The declaration reads, "The Senate's advice and consent is subject to
the following declarations: (1) That the United States declares that the provisions
of article 1 through 16 of the Convention are not self-executing." Id.
63 See In re H-M-V, 22 I. & N. Dec. 256 (BIA 1998) (holding that the Board of
Immigration Appeals lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate a claim based on Article 3 of
the Convention against Torture without a specific statute or regulation to imple-
ment the treaty).
64 FOREIGN AFFAIRS REFORM AND RESTRUCTURING ACT OF 1998, 8 U.S.C.S. §
1231 (LEXISNEXiS 2006).
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for the process by which an individual could seek relief under
Article 3 of the Convention against Torture. 65 Subsequently,
the interim rule was codified in the Code of Federal Regula-
tions.66 The regulations set forth two ways by which an appli-
cant can be protected under Article 3 of the Convention against
Torture: withholding of removal and deferral of removal.67 An
applicant qualifies for withholding or deferral of removal if the
applicant demonstrates that "it is more likely than not that he
or she would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of
removal."68 The Regulations define torture the same way that
Article 3 of the Convention against Torture defines it.69 How-
ever, the regulations add an additional provision not found in
Article 3 of the Convention against Torture, which states that,
"[i]n order to constitute torture, an act must be specifically in-
tended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering. An
act that results in unanticipated or unintended severity of pain
and suffering is not torture."70
While the United States incorporated the CAT's definition
of torture into the implementing regulations, 71 the regulations
add an additional qualification for the phrase "intentionally in-
flicted."72 The definition states that for an act to be torture, it
must be "specifically intended to inflict severe physical or
mental pain or suffering."73 This additional provision was ad-
ded pursuant to the first condition of ratification set forth by
the U.S. Senate. 74 At least one country, the Netherlands, ex-
pressed its concern over the condition, as it was perceived "to
restrict the scope of the definition of torture under Article 1 of
the Convention [against Torture]." 75
65 Regulations Concerning the Convention Against Torture, 64 Fed. Reg.
8478, 8478 (Feb. 19, 1999) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 3, 103, 208, 235, 238, 240,
241, 253, and 507).
66 8 C.F.R. § 208.16.
67 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(4).
68 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2).
69 Compare supra Part III.B., with 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1).
70 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(5) (emphasis added).
71 Compare supra Part III.B., with 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1).
72 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1).
73 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(5).
74 Convention against Torture, supra note 3, Declarations and Reservations of
the U.S.
75 Id., Objections of the Netherlands.
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V. SPECIFIC INTENT ELEMENT FOR WITHHOLDING
OF REMOVAL UNDER CAT
An applicant, such as Jacque, seeking relief under the Con-
vention against Torture, need only show that it is more likely
than not that he would be subjected to torture if returned to the
proposed country of removal. One of the critical determinations
for the court is whether the applicant will suffer persecution, as
promulgated in the regulations. 76 The regulations set forth five
elements that must be satisfied for persecution to rise to the
level of torture.7 7 The element at issue in this Comment pro-
vides that an act of torture must be "specifically intended. s78 As
shown in the following section, the courts have had difficulty
determining the meaning of "intent." In fact, courts are some-
what divided on the issue of whether "intent," for the purposes
of relief under the Convention against Torture, requires general
or specific intent.79
In cases where a government or group of individuals inflict
severe persecution in response to a specific attribute of the ap-
plicant, such as race, nationality, or political opinion, the intent
of the persecutors can be ascertained fairly easily. Thus, the
question of general or specific intent does not arise. However,
cases regarding deplorable prison conditions, where intent is
not so easily inferred, magnify the importance of interpreting
the "intent" element. Accordingly, many of the following cases
illustrate the determination of whether deplorable prison condi-
tions constitute the regulatory definition of torture.
A. Interpretations of the Board of Immigration Appeals
1. Majority Opinion of In re J-E-
The most influential case regarding the interpretation of
the "specifically intended" element of torture was decided by the
Board of Immigration Appeals (the "Board" or the "BIA") in In
76 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1).
77 In re J-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 291, 297 (BIA 2002).
78 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(5).
79 Compare Habtemicael v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 774, 782 (8th Cir. 2004), and
Zubeda v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 463, 473 (3d Cir. 2003), with Auguste v. Ridge, 395
F.3d 123, 147 (3d Cir. 2005), and Cadet v. Bulger, 377 F.3d 1173, 1190 (11th Cir.
2004).
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re J-E-.80 The Board, sitting en banc, heard a case in which a
Haitian immigrant sought Withholding of Removal under the
Convention against Torture ("CAT relief')."' The immigrant ar-
gued that he would be subjected to torture in Haiti because
criminal deportees, such as the Respondent, were known to be
"detained indefinitely in prison facilities where prisoners are
subjected to inhuman conditions and police mistreatment."8 2
The critical question for the Board was whether indefinite de-
tention, inhuman prison conditions, and police mistreatment fit
within the regulatory definition of torture.8 3 The definition of
torture, according to the majority, included a specific intent re-
quirement.8 4 The Board supported this interpretation by citing
the legislative history of the treaty.8 5 The Board declared that
the "ratification documents8 6 make it clear that [the phrase spe-
cifically intended] is a 'specific intent' requirement, not a gen-
eral intent requirement. ' '8 7 Therefore, a torturer must intend to
bring about severe pain and suffering, not merely know that his
deliberate actions will result in severe pain or suffering, for a
given act to meet the statutory definition of torture.88
Applying this standard of intent, the Board analyzed the
indefinite detention policy, inhumane prison conditions, and po-
lice mistreatment separately.8 9 The Board concluded that none
met the regulatory definition of torture. The Board reasoned
that Haiti's detention policy was not specifically intended to
bring about severe physical or mental pain or suffering.90
The Board stated, "Although Haitian authorities are inten-
tionally detaining criminal deportees knowing that the deten-
tion facilities are substandard, there is no evidence that they
80 See In re J-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 297.
81 See id. at 292-94.
82 Id. at 299.
83 See id.
84 See id. at 298.
85 See id. at 301.
86 One of the ratification documents referred to by the Court states explicitly
that "[b]ecause specific intent is required, an act that results in unanticipated and
unintended severity of pain and suffering is not torture for purposes of this Con-
vention." REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, S. ExEc. Doc. No.
30, at 14 (1990).
87 In re J-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 298, 301.
88 See id. at 298, 301.
89 See id. at 299-302.
90 See id. at 300; 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(5).
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are intentionally and deliberately creating and maintaining
such prison conditions in order to inflict torture."91 Therefore,
the prison conditions were not "specifically intended" to bring
about severe pain or suffering 2
The Board further determined that Haitian prison condi-
tions were the result of "budgetary and management
problems." 93 The Board supported this conclusion by noting
that "the Haitian Government 'freely permitted the ICRC [In-
ternational Committee of the Red Cross], the Haitian Red
Cross, MICAH [International Civilian Mission for Support in
Haiti], and other human rights groups to enter prisons and po-
lice stations, monitor conditions, and assist prisoners with med-
ical care, food, and legal aid."' 94
2. Dissenting opinions of In re J-E-
The dissenting opinion of Paul Wickham Schmidt, joined by
four other members, criticized the majority opinion's separate
analysis of indefinite detention, prison conditions, and police
mistreatment. 95 According to the dissent, "[i]n essence, the ma-
jority errs by looking at the various factors that contribute to
the abuse of Haitian returnees in isolation, and not as a
whole."96 The Wickham dissent also implied that to satisfy the
intent requirement, the Haitian government need only inten-
tionally detain the deportees with knowledge of what will hap-
pen in the deplorable prison conditions. 97 The dissent further
stated, "[t]hese authorities have continued the policy of detain-
ing returnees with the full knowledge ... that returnees will be
forced to endure horrific prison conditions as well as starvation,
beatings, and other forms of physical abuse."98 To further illus-
trate, the dissent supported its claim that Haitian prison condi-
tions fall within the meaning of 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1) by
91 In re J-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 301.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 301.
95 See supra Part IV.A.1.
96 In re J-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 309.
97 See id. at 307-08.
98 Id. at 307 (emphasis added).
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noting that, "[tihe Government of Haiti cannot claim that it
does not know what happens to detainees in its prisons."99
The dissenting opinion of Lory Rosenberg also opposed the
majority's interpretation of the phrase "specifically in-
tended." 100 According to the Rosenberg dissent, the phrase
"specifically intended" does not impose a specific intent require-
ment as the term is used in criminal law. The Rosenberg dis-
sent asserted that 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(5) "reflects only that
something more than an accidental consequence is necessary to
establish the probability of torture."''1 It pointed out the diffi-
culties in ascertaining the subjective intent of any individual, as
reflected in the various standards of proof for different areas of
law such as criminal law, torts, and statutory civil rights.10 2
The imposition of a specific intent requirement, according to the
Rosenberg dissent, would make it "difficult, if not impossible, to
prove specific intent in a prospective context."10 3
Since the In re J-E- decision, it has served as a foundation
for the analysis of the intent requirement for Withholding of Re-
moval under CAT. 10 4 While some of the holdings of In re J-E-
have been repudiated, 0 5 the central holding on the regulatory
intent requirement for acts constituting torture has been fol-
lowed106 with only a few exceptions. 0 7
B. Third Circuit Interpretations
1. Zubeda v. Ashcroft
In Zubeda v. Ashcroft, the Court reviewed the decision of
the BIA, reversing an Immigration Judge's grant of CAT relief
to Takky Zubeda. Zubeda testified that she and her family were
raped in her home country, the Democratic Republic of
99 Id. at 308 (emphasis added).
100 Id. at 316.
101 Id.
102 In re J-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 316.
103 Id.
104 See Auguste v. Ridge, 395 F.3d 123 (3d Cir. 2005); Khouzam v. Ashcroft,
361 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2004); Zubeda v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 463 (3d Cir. 2003);
Thelemaque v. Ashcroft, 363 F. Supp. 2d 198 (D. Conn. 2005).
105 See generally Khouzam, 361 F.3d 161.
106 See generally Auguste, 395 F.3d 123; Thelemaque, 363 F. Supp. 2d 198.
107 See, e.g., Zubeda, 333 F.3d at 463.
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Congo. 08 The Court vacated the BIA's opinion and remanded
the case to the Immigration Judge. 0 9 The Court criticized the
BIA's decision for a number of deficiencies. For example, the
Court took strong exception to the determination of the likeli-
hood of torture11 ° and the BIA's analysis of country reports.",
However, the Court never criticized the BIA's interpretation of
the intent necessary for CAT relief.
Nevertheless, the Court dedicated a substantial portion of
the opinion to an interpretation of the regulations' provision
that an act must be "specifically intended."1" 2 Beginning its
analysis, the Court stated explicitly, "[allthough the regulations
require that severe pain or suffering be intentionally inflicted,
we do not interpret this as a specific intent requirement.
Rather, we conclude that the Convention simply excludes se-
vere pain or suffering that is the unintended consequence of an
intentional act."11 3 The Court supported this interpretation by
noting that the threat of severe physical pain or suffering
amounts to torture."14 The Court reasoned that such a provi-
sion demonstrates that "the Convention does not require that
the persecutor actually intend to cause the threatened result. It
is sufficient if the persecutor causes severe psychological suffer-
ing by threatening beatings for one of the specified purposes
such as extracting information or coercing a confession."" 5 Ac-
cording to the Court, an applicant seeking CAT relief need only
show that the persecutor would cause severe suffering for a
specified purpose to satisfy the intent element set forth in the
regulations. Finally, the Court supported its interpretation on
a pragmatic level noting that to require "an alien to establish
the specific intent of his/her persecutors could impose insur-
mountable obstacles to affording the very protections the com-
108 See id. at 467.
109 See id. at 480.
110 See id. at 475 n.13. ("The BIA's reference to isolated instances of mistreat-
ment is both puzzling and troubling. The relevant reports here describe mistreat-
ment in the DRC as systematic and large scale, not isolated instances as the BIA
suggests."). Id.
111 See Zubeda, 333 F.3d at 475.
112 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(5).
113 Zubeda, 333 F.3d at 473 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
114 Id. at 474.
115 Id.
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munity of nations sought to guarantee under the Convention
Against Torture."116
Although this interpretation stands in stark contrast to the
BIA's specific intent requirement announced in In re J-E-,"' 7
the Court never addressed the inconsistency in its discussion on
the requisite intent. While the Court discussed and set forth a
standard of intent for CAT relief, the Court's decision did not
necessarily depend on it.
2. Auguste v. Ridge
Conversely, the Third Circuit, in Auguste v. Ridge, directly
addressed the requisite intent for Withholding of Removal
under CAT." 8 Auguste involved the petition for Deferral of Re-
moval by a Haitian national claiming that the deplorable condi-
tions and indefinite detention policy in Haiti amount to the
regulatory definition of torture. 1' 9 In contrast to its previous
decision in Zubeda, the Court concluded that implementing the
regulations of the Convention against Torture requires a show-
ing of specific intent for an act to be considered "torture."'120
The Court in Auguste relied primarily on the ratification
history of the Convention against Torture.' 2 ' The Court cited a
cover letter from the Assistant Secretary, Legislative Affairs,
Department of State to the Chairman of the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations, which stated that the understanding re-
flects the Department of State's position that specific intent is
required for an act to constitute torture. 122 The Court sup-
ported its conclusion that the phrase "specifically intended"
amounts to a specific intent requirement by noting that the
"term 'specific intent' by its ordinary usage in American law as
the 'intent to accomplish the precise criminal act that one is
later charged with."' 23 Auguste argued that requisite intent
116 Zubeda, 333 F.3d at 474; see also Karen Musalo, Irreconcilable Differences?
Divorcing Refugee Protections from Human Rights Norms, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L.
1179, 1210 (1994) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
117 In re J-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 291, 301 (BIA 2002).
118 See Auguste v. Ridge, 395 F.3d 123 (3d Cir. 2005).
119 See id. at 129.
120 See id. at 123.
121 See id. at 139.
122 Id. at 131 n.3.
123 Auguste, 395 F.3d at 139 (quoting In re J-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 291, 301 (BIA
2002)).
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can be satisfied as long as the actor had knowledge that his ac-
tions might cause severe pain or suffering. The Court rejected
this argument on the grounds that both the President and the
Senate understood that the definition of torture included a spe-
cific intent requirement. 124 Therefore, the Court was "obliged
to give that understanding effect."125 Finally, the Court
explained,
[w]e also believe it to be telling that both Presidents Reagan and
Bush submitted the condition interpreting Article 1 with the 'spe-
cifically intended' language as an understanding, and not as a res-
ervation or declaration. This suggests to us that the commonly
understood meaning at the time of ratification was that, at least
to the United States, the specific intent standard was consistent
with a reasonable interpretation of the language in Article 1.126
As a result, the Court found that mere knowledge that one's
deliberate actions will result in severe pain and suffering did
not satisfy the requisite intent under the regulatory definition
of torture. 127 Rather, one must "expressly intend to achieve the
forbidden act. '128 After determining the legal issues, the Court
applied the law to the facts. The Court concluded that there
was no evidence that the Haitian authorities placed detainees
in deplorable conditions to inflict severe pain and suffering and
denied Auguste's petition. 129
3. Lavira v. Attorney General of the U.S.
In subsequent cases, the Third Circuit faithfully followed
the Auguste precedent on specific intent. 130 Then, in Lavira v.
Attorney General of the U.S., the Court was forced to apply the
specific intent standard to a case brought by a disabled, HIV-
positive criminal deportee from Haiti. In the end, the Court re-
manded the case so that the Immigration Judge ("IJ") could re-
124 Id. at 142.
125 Id.
126 Id. at 125.
127 See id. at 148.
128 Id. at 145.
129 See Auguste, 395 F.3d at 153-54.
130 See generally, e.g., Toussaint v. Attorney General, 455 F.3d 409 (3d Cir.
2006); Francois, 448 F.3d 645; Auguste, 395 F.3d 123; Thelemaque, 363 F. Supp. 2d
198.
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examine several issues. 131 In this Comment, the analysis of
Lavira will focus exclusively on the holding addressing the spe-
cific intent doctrine. 132
Maurice Lavira is an HIV-positive, above-the-knee ampu-
tee 33 convicted for purchasing drugs. 34 Michelle Karshan, an
expert in the Haitian prison system, testified that Lavira,
"would not receive any meaningful medical treatment,"135 that
"Lavira would face the exceptionally dire prospect of losing 30
pounds soon after being incarcerated," and that "death would
follow shortly after."1 36 Lavira argued that "to place him know-
ingly in the disease-infested Haitian facility is to intentionally
subject him to severe pain and suffering, even death." Lavira
argued that "his obvious vulnerability and its nearly inevitable
consequences. . .satisfy the requirement that the harm that
awaits him is specifically intended." 137 Yet, the Immigration
Judge denied his claim for withholding of removal under the
Convention of Torture and ordered him to be deported. 38 At-
tempting to follow the specific intent principle set forth in Au-
guste, the IJ stated:
To be sure the respondent does have certain disabilities, but there
is no evidence that has been submitted other than evidence relat-
ing to the general overall deplorable conditions that could lead
this Court to conclude that the respondent would be placed or de-
tained upon this return to Haiti with an intent to inflict severe
pain or suffering.139
131 Lavira v. Att'y Gen. of the United States, 478 F.3d 158, 172 (3d. Cir. 2007).
132 The holding in Lavira addressed two other major issues. First, the Court
had to decide whether Lavira's crime constituted a particularly serious crime.
Lavira, 478 F.3d at 172. Second, the court had to decide whether Lavira's status
as an HIV-positive amputee would make it "more likely than not" that Lavira
would suffer at the hands of prison guards. See id. at 169. Incidentally, the facts
set forth in this comment, see infra Part VI.B, are sufficient to prove that criminal
deportees as a whole stand out more than the average prisoner in the Haitian
National Penitentiary, and thus, it is more likely that they will suffer physical
abuse by the Haitian prison guards.
133 Lavira, 478 F.3d 158, 159.
134 Id. at 158-59.
135 Id. at 171.
136 Id.
137 Id. at 169.
138 Lavira, 478 F.3d at 172.
139 Id. at 164 (quoting the Immigration Judge).
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The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the Immigra-
tion Judge's decision, 140 but the Third Circuit remanded the
case based, in part, on its modification of the specific intent doc-
trine.141 First, the Court reaffirmed that "poor prison condi-
tions did not constitute torture because they were not
specifically directed by officials towards him or intended by offi-
cials to cause severe pain and suffering. " 142 Then, recognizing
the difficulty in proving intent, the Court declared:
[Diemonstrating proof of intent is necessarily an inferential en-
deavor in nearly every case; we must draw conclusions about ac-
tors' mental states from the conduct of those actors. In the CAT
setting, those inferences are based on reports of the current activ-
ity in the proposed country of removal and predictions about what
results will befall an individual after removal .... [I]n this (the
CAT claim) setting, the IJ must make predictions about future
states of mind. The CAT's implementing regulations recognize
these concerns .... As such, IJs must be careful given the predic-
tive and thus necessarily speculative inquiry into intent. 143
Accordingly, the Court announced that "intent can be proven
through evidence of willful blindness," but mere recklessness
could not satisfy the specific intent element under CAT. 144 The
Court attempted to distinguish Lavira from other criminal de-
portees by exclaiming:
There is no dispute that the conditions are rife with disease
and comparable to a 'slave ship.' Severe pain is not 'a' possible
consequence that 'may result' from placing Lavira in the facility,
it is the only plausible consequence given what Haitian officials
know about their own facility. 145
Nevertheless, it appears that the Court based its decision
primarily on the fact that Lavira, if deported, would suffer in
ways different from the general prison population. For exam-
ple, in the section of the opinion distinguishing Lavira from Au-
guste, the Court stated, "[t]here was nothing about Auguste's
physical or mental condition which set him apart from the peti-
140 Id.
141 See generally id.
142 Id. at 169.
143 Id. at 171.
144 Lavira, 478 F.3d at 171.
145 Id. at 170.
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tioner in Matter of J-E- or the general population incarcerated
at the facility .... "146 Even more illustrative is the Court's
characterization of Auguste's claim: "Auguste's claim failed be-
cause he was understood to be presenting a generalized claim
against the Haitian facility no different from the matter
presented in Matter of J-E- ."147 In contrast, the Court described
Lavira's claim as an "individualized attack on his removal to
Haiti." 148
C. Interpretations by other Circuits
1. Cadet v. Bulger
In Cadet v. Bulger, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
reviewed a petition by Jean Neckson Cadet seeking relief under
the Convention against Torture. 149 The Eleventh Circuit evalu-
ated Cadet's claim by separately analyzing Haiti's policy of in-
definite detention, inhumane prison conditions, and police
brutality, much in the same way that the Board of Immigration
Appeals did in In re J-E-.150 Additionally, the Court took the
same position as the Third Circuit did in Auguste,1 51 denying
Cadet's claim on the grounds that neither Haiti's policy of indef-
inite detention, nor the inhumane prison conditions, nor the
"isolated" instances of police brutality constituted torture be-
cause none of them were created or maintained for the purpose
of bringing about severe pain or suffering.1 52
The Court's reasoning in Cadet focused primarily on In re
J-E-.153 The Court declared: "In light of... our required Chev-
ron deference, we cannot say that the distinction drawn by the
BIA and legal conclusions in J-E- are arbitrary, capricious, or
unreasonable."1 54 Indeed, the Court agreed with many of the
146 Id. at 168.
147 Id. at 169.
148 Id. at 172.
149 Cadet v. Bulger, 377 F.3d 1173 (11th Cir. 2004).
150 Compare Cadet v. Bulger, 377 F.3d 1173, 1179-90 (11th Cir. 2004), with In
re J-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 291, 299-302 (BIA 2002).
151 Compare Cadet, 377 F.3d 1173, with Auguste v. Ridge, 395 F.3d 123 (3d
Cir. 2005).
152 Cadet, 377 F.3d at 1191.
153 See id. at 1191-95.
154 Id. at 1195.
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BIA's findings. 155 While the Court took great care to compare
In re J-E- and this case, 156 the Court neglected to include a dis-
cussion regarding the grounds for applying a specific intent
standard.157
D. Predominant Interpretation and its Analytical Framework
Notwithstanding the dissent in In re J-E-, the Zubeda deci-
sion, and the suggestion in Habtemicael,158 the BIA and many
circuit courts read 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1) and § 208.18(a)(5) to
mean that a persecutor must intend to bring about severe pain
and suffering, not merely foresee that his deliberate actions will
result in severe pain or suffering. 159 As a result, those seeking
Withholding of Removal under the Convention against Torture
must prove that those who would torture them would do so for
the purpose of causing severe pain and suffering.
Supporters of a specific intent requirement rely heavily on
the Senate's understandings and ratifying documents which ex-
press the Executive's and the Senate's interpretation of the
phrases "intentionally inflicted" 160  and "specifically in-
tended."' 6 ' For example, the Court in Auguste, citing the legis-
lative history of the treaty, stated:
Thus, we are presented with a situation where both the Presi-
dent and the Senate, the two institutions of the federal govern-
ment with treaty-making process [sic], agreed during the
ratification stage that their understanding of the definition of tor-
ture contained in Article 1 of the Convention included a specific
intent requirement. In our view, this is enough to require that
the understanding accompanying the United States' [sic] ratifica-
155 See id. at 1194.
156 Id. at 1190-95.
157 See id. at 1185. Instead of reviewing the validity of the specific intent stan-
dard, the Court briefly discussed the "Chevron" deference. Id.
158 Habtemicael v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 774, 782 (8th Cir. 2004) (stating that the
specific intent "requirement is satisfied if prolonged mental pain or suffering ei-
ther is purposefully inflicted or is the foreseeable consequence of a deliberate
act.").
159 See Francois v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 645, 651 (3d Cir. 2006) (relying on Au-
guste v. Ridge, 395 F.3d 123 (3d Cir. 2005); Auguste, 395 F.3d at 148 (dismissing
Zubeda's discussion supporting the general intent standard as dicta); Cadet, 377
F.3d at 1191; In re J-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 291, 301 (BIA 2002).
160 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1).
161 8 C.F.R § 208.18(a)(5).
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tion of the Convention be given domestic legal effect, regardless of
any contention that the understanding may be invalid under in-
ternational norms governing the formation of treaties or the
terms of the Convention itself.162
Similarly, the BIA in In re J-E- cited a Committee on For-
eign Relations Report, which states:
Further, the requirement of intent to cause severe pain and
suffering is of particular importance in the case of alleged menial
pain and suffering, as well as in cases where unexpectedly severe
physical suffering is caused. Because specific intent is required,
an act that results in unanticipated and unintended severity of
pain and suffering is not torture for purposes of this
Convention. 163
As Auguste controls the Third Circuit cases, and not
Zubeda, specific intent is the standard adopted by most
courts.16 4 The analytical framework, used by the court in Au-
guste, has two main components. First, the framework used by
the Court does not give a rebuttable presumption that a perse-
cutor intended the natural and probable consequences of the
persecutor's deliberate actions. 165 Second, the framework ana-
lyzes indefinite detention, deplorable prison conditions, and po-
lice brutality separately.
1. The Lavira Contradiction
The only way to reconcile the Auguste and Lavira 66 deci-
sions regarding specific intent in the context of prison condi-
tions requires the following: the specific intent standard is not
met when a persecutor intends a certain action but does not in-
tend the reasonably foreseeable consequences of the action
162 Auguste, 395 F.3d at 143.
163 REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, S. ExEc. Doc. No. 30,
at 14 (1990).
164 See Francois, 448 F.3d at 651 (relying on Auguste, 395 F.3d 123); Auguste,
395 F.3d at 148 (dismissing Zubeda's discussion supporting the general intent
standard as dicta); Cadet, 377 F.3d at 1191; In re J-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 301.
165 See Auguste, 395 F.3d at 123.
166 Indeed, it is impossible to reconcile Lavira and In re J-E- as the Board in In
re J-E- stated explicitly: "Although Haitian authorities are intentionally detaining
criminal deportees knowing that the detention facilities are substandard, there is
no evidence that they are intentionally and deliberately creating and maintaining
such prison conditions in order to inflict torture." In re J-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 301.
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which results in severe pain and suffering. 167 However, the
specific intent standard is satisfied when "severe pain is not 'a'
possible consequence that 'may result' from . .."16 a particular
action, but rather, ". . . it is the only plausible consequence
given what .. .,"169 the persecutor knows. In other words, the
persecutor is deliberately ignorant or willfully blind. While this
reconciliation is true to the normal definitions of specific intent
in a criminal law context, it ignores the facts. Although
Lavira's prospective harm was greater in degree than Auguste's,
Toussaint's and Francois's, it was no more inevitable. By plac-
ing the criminal deportees in deplorable prison conditions indef-
initely, all criminal deportees are guaranteed to endure severe
pain and suffering due to starvation, crowded facilities, vio-
lence, and general prejudice from the community. Therefore,
the doctrine of willful blindness applies exactly the same way to
healthy and disabled criminal deportees. Indeed the Board in
In re J-E- admitted that Haitian officials had knowledge of the
consequences of their actions, but the Board denied the claim
because the authorities did not intend to inflict severe pain and
suffering. 170
VI. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Specific Intent and General Intent
1. Argument for adopting a General Intent Standard
While the original text of the Convention against Torture
states that torture need only be "intentionally inflicted,"171 the
U.S. signed the treaty with the understanding that the phrase
"intentionally inflicted" meant "specifically intended."172 Al-
though other signatories to the Convention against Torture ob-
jected, 173 the Senate and both Presidents Reagan and Bush
signed the convention with the understanding that specific in-
tent was required. 174
167 Auguste, 395 F.3d at 147.
168 Lavira v. Att'y Gen. of the United States, 478 F.3d 158, 170 (3d Cir. 2007).
169 Id.
170 In re J-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 301.
171 Convention against Torture, supra note 3, art. 1.
172 Id., Declarations and Reservations of the U.S.
173 Id., Objections of the Netherlands.
174 See Auguste v. Ridge, 395 F.3d 123, 143 (3d Cir. 2005).
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The specific intent requirement creates an unnecessarily
high burden on an applicant and is, therefore, inconsistent with
the purpose of the Convention against Torture. Both the Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations Report 175 and 8 C.F.R. § 208.18
(a)(5) state that the requisite standard of intent serves to ex-
clude from the regulatory definition of torture acts that result
in unanticipated or unintended pain and suffering. If the pur-
pose of the intent requirement is simply to exclude from the def-
inition of torture acts that result in unanticipated suffering, the
specific intent requirement does so, but in the process excludes
many other torturous acts.
For example, the specific intent standard will not be met in
situations where the persecutor reasonably foresees that his ac-
tions will cause extreme pain or suffering, as long as some non-
sadistic consideration, such as national security, motivated the
persecutor. The Court in Auguste stated this proposition explic-
itly. "I f the actor intended the act but did not intend the conse-
quences of the act, i.e., the infliction of severe pain and
suffering, although such pain and suffering may have been a
foreseeable consequence, the specific intent standard would not
be satisfied.' 176 Finally, imposing a specific intent requirement,
and thereby unnecessarily narrowing the definition of torture,
would abrogate the very purpose of the Senate's ratification, "to
make more effective the struggle against torture and other
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment through-
out the world."1 77 While the Senate understood the treaty to
impose a specific intent standard, the court need not impose a
standard that effectively undercuts the purpose for which the
Senate ratified the treaty.
Moreover, a general intent standard would more accurately
implement the Senate's purpose for the intent element, exclud-
ing unanticipated pain and suffering, because "causing a pro-
hibited result through accident, mistake, carelessness, or
absent-mindedness" 178 does not satisfy the general intent stan-
dard. A general intent standard would also more effectively
175 REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, S. ExEc. Doc. No. 30,
at 14 (1990).
176 Auguste, 395 F.3d at 147 (emphasis added).
177 Convention against Torture, supra note 3, pmbl.
178 21 Am. JuR. 2D Criminal Law § 127 (2006).
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achieve the purpose of the entire treaty, "to make more effective
the struggle against torture and other cruel, inhumane or de-
grading treatment or punishment throughout the world,"'1 79 by
expanding the definition of torture and thereby offering relief to
more people who suffer cruel and inhumane punishment. Ac-
cordingly, circuits that have not directly ruled on the statutory
definition of torture should follow Zubeda, the dissent in In re
J-E-, and Habtemicael, and interpret 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1)
and § 208.18(a)(5) to impose a general intent standard.
2. New Framework for Specific Intent Analysis
Even if a court concludes that specific intent, as understood
in American criminal law, is the requisite standard, the court
should not use the same analytical framework used in Auguste
and In re J-E-. First, the courts in those cases did not apply the
specific intent standard as it is commonly understood in Ameri-
can criminal law. Typically, the court, in a criminal proceeding,
will presume that a person intends all the natural and probable
consequences of their actions, regardless of whether it is a spe-
cific or general intent crime.'8 0 The Courts in Auguste and In re
J-E- never afforded the Petitioners the benefit of such a pre-
sumption."8 ' The Court in Auguste stated, "if the actor in-
tended the act but did not intend the consequences of the act,
i.e., the infliction of severe pain and suffering, although such
pain and suffering may have been a foreseeable consequence, the
specific intent standard would not be satisfied." 18 2 This reason-
ing does not accurately reflect specific intent, as it is commonly
understood in criminal law because when a result is a foresee-
able consequence (i.e. the result is the natural and probable
consequence of an action) a court will presume that the actor
intended such a result, unless there is some other evidence to
the contrary.' 8 3 While there may be some debate as to whether
there was evidence to the contrary, the Courts in Auguste and
In re J-E- failed to use, or even mention, the typical analysis
179 Convention against Torture, supra note 3, pmbl.
180 See 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 43 (2006); see also Laws v. United States, 66
F.2d 870, 872 (10th Cir. 1933).
181 See generally Auguste, 395 F.3d 123; In re J-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 291 (BIA
2002).
182 Auguste, 395 F.3d at 146 (emphasis added).
1s3 See McDonald v. United States, 9 F.2d 506, 508 (8th Cir. 1925).
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used in criminal cases. Accordingly, this Comment asserts that
the natural and probable consequences of a persecutor's actions
which result in torture should give rise to a rebuttable pre-
sumption that the persecutor intended the result of his volun-
tary actions because this is the "ordinary usage [of specific
intent] in American law."18 4 This analysis is superior to the
analysis in Auguste and In re J-E- for two reasons. First, and
most importantly, it more accurately reflects the meaning of
specific intent as it is understood in criminal law. Second, when
torture results from the natural and probable consequences of a
deliberate act, the government, not the alien, would have to pro-
vide evidence that the persecutor did not specifically intend the
torturous results. This analysis is preferable because the gov-
ernment has the resources to do the complex investigation re-
quired to prove the intent of a persecutor located thousands of
miles away.
In addition, the Courts in Auguste and In re J-E- separately
analyzed Haiti's indefinite detention policy, the inhumane con-
ditions, and police brutality. This type of analysis inadequately
attempts to isolate the legal issues, but in the process, distorts
the reality of conditions in Haitian prisons. An independent
analysis of indefinite detention does not capture the essence of
Haitian prison conditions. The horrific nature of Haitian prison
conditions is due in part to the fact that indefinite detention
occurs, not in a jail cell with running water and enough food for
the inmates, but in a squalid jail cell with forty other inmates
and with the only prospect of release being a bribe to the prison
officials or a family member sponsorship. Therefore, this Com-
ment recommends that the BIA and the Circuit Courts of Ap-
peals, first, allow a rebuttable presumption of specific intent
when torture is the natural and probable consequence of the
persecutor's deliberate actions. Second, the courts should ana-
lyze the Haitian prison system as a whole to determine whether
the system causes "torture."
B. Haitian Prison Conditions and Specific Intent
The Board of Immigration Appeals and the Third Circuit
have chronicled the conditions of the Haitian prison system.
184 Auguste, 395 F.3d at 139 (quoting In re J-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 301).
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Both the BIA and the Third Circuit had evidence that criminal
deportees from the United States are routinely held indefinitely
in Haitian prisons18 5 with other prisoners in the National Peni-
tentiary.'l 6 The Court in Francois had evidence that a deportee
may be released within three months if a close family member
agrees, in writing, to turn them self in to be arrested if the de-
portee commits a crime and is not apprehended. 8 7 The Court
in Toussaint also had evidence that bribery can secure the re-
lease of deportees. The Court in Auguste gave a thorough
description of the squalid conditions in which Haitian criminal
deportees are held indefinitely.188  The court noted that the
cells are so overcrowded that prisoners must sleep sitting or
standing up, and that roaches, rats, mice and lizards infest the
cells.' 8 9 The bags in which prisoners must defecate remain un-
collected for days and often spill onto the floor.' 90 The Court
further observed that "malnutrition and starvation is a continu-
ous problem."191 In addition, the Court discussed reports of
prison guards abusing inmates using tactics such as electric
shock, burning with cigarettes, and choking. 192
Although the Courts appeared to have had a clear picture
of the Haitian prison system, they lacked one crucial piece of
evidence: the widespread hatred of criminal deportees from the
United States, and Americanized Haitians in general. In this
Comment, I hope to show new facts which will demonstrate that
the Haitian authorities, due to an unreasonable fear of criminal
deportees from the United States, place Americanized criminal
deportees into the prison system for the specific purpose of
causing severe pain and suffering on those criminal deportees,
thereby distinguishing future cases from In re J-E-, Auguste,
Toussaint, and Francois. Although the Courts did not have the
luxury of such evidence of the widespread hatred of criminal de-
portees in Haiti, the phenomenon is well documented.
185 Auguste, 395 F.3d at 129; In re J-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 293.
186 Francois v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 645, 650 (3d Cir. 2006).
187 Id. at 650-51.
188 Auguste, 395 F.3d at 129.
189 Id. at 129.
190 Id.
191 Id.
192 Id.
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For example, The Office of the United Nations High Com-
missioner for Human Rights reports that "there is great hostil-
ity towards deportees." 193 Similarly, the International Crisis
Group described deportees from the United States as "society's
outcasts."19 4 A local Florida newspaper reported that American
criminal deportees even have trouble finding work, in part, due
to "the stigma of deportation."1 95 In addition, deportees are
often the target of violence and persecution simply because they
were deported from the U.S.196
Alternative Chance, a non-profit organization headed by
expert Michelle Karshan, who testified in Lavira, documented
some of the stories which illustrate the country-wide discrimi-
nation against criminal deportees:
Max (from Miami), Marc (aka "Gambino" from New York), and
Patrick (from New York). A police officer living in the same
neighborhood as Marc had a grudge against him because he was a
Criminal Deportee and had a car and money. The police and one
of the three men got into a fight in front of Munchies, a restaurant
in Petionville which is famous for carnival activities held in front
of the restaurant on some Sundays. The three deportees ran but
were later fingered by that one police officer and were arrested in
Petionville but were taken to the Thomassin 25 police station in a
suburb far above Petionville for the express purpose of beating
and torturing them. The three Criminal Deportees were severely
beaten and tortured by police. According to a [sic] eyewitness, a
few days later the police took the three Criminal Deportees out of
the police station and executed them. Marc's mother in New York
was said to have had a stroke as a result of learning of her son's
execution.1 97
193 Independent Expert, Situation of Human Rights in Haiti, 33, U.N. DOC.
E/CN.4/2006/115 (Jan. 24, 2006), available at http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/dpage
_e.aspx?m=47 (follow "Report of the Independent expert on the situation of human
rights in Haiti, Lois Joinet" hyperlink).
194 Crisis Group Latin America/Caribbean Report, Spoiling Security in Haiti,
at 7 (2005), available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3485.
195 Ruth Morris, For Haitian deportees, American-style "grills' mark them as
targets for violence, hate, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Dec. 29, 2006, available at http:l/
www.alternativechance.org (follow "For Haitian deportees, American-style 'grills'
mark them as targets for violence, hate" hyperlink).
196 See id.
197 Michelle Karshan, Preliminary Reports by Michelle Karshan on Police Ex-
ecutions and Torture of Criminal Deportees in Haiti 2004-2006, Oct. 23, 2006,
available at http://www.alternativechance.org (follow "Articles about Deportation
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Alternative Chance documented numerous other abuses, as
well. Ultimately, the widespread xenophobia towards criminal
deportees resulted in outlandish accusations by the Haitian
government.
For instance, the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights reported that government officials suspect the criminal
deportees of "masterminding the wave of kidnappings in Haiti
and to be involved in drug trafficking and the arms trade, based
upon the experience that they have gained from their criminal
activities in other countries."'198 Based on these unsubstanti-
ated accusations, the Haitian government claims that the de-
tention of criminal deportees is for security purposes, yet
"Haiti's government doesn't track how many crimes are commit-
ted by people who have been deported."'199 Moreover, "no hard
evidence exists to suggest they [criminal deportees] signifi-
cantly affect crime in Haiti. ' 200 Indeed, many Haitians have
called on the government to substantiate their claims that crim-
inal deportees from the United States are causing chaos in Ha-
iti, but the Haitian government has yet to substantiate their
claim. 201
The Third Circuit, in Auguste, carefully explained that,
.if there is evidence that authorities are placing an individ-
ual in such conditions with the intent to inflict severe pain and
suffering on that individual, such an act may rise to the level of
torture should the other requirements of the Convention be
met."202 The facts set forth above demonstrate that Haitian au-
thorities place criminal deportees in horrid prison conditions
to Haiti, Alternative Chance, and Criminal Deportation in general" hyperlink;
then follow "Preliminary Report by Michelle Karshan on Police Executions & Tor-
ture of Criminal Deportees in Haiti 2004-2006" hyperlink).
198 General Secretariat, Haiti: Failed Justice or the Rule of Law? Challenges
Ahead for Haiti and the International Community, $ 211, OEA/Ser/L/V1I. 123 doc.
6 rev 1 (Oct. 26, 2005), available at http://www.cidh.org/countryrep/HAITI%20EN-
GLISH7X10%20FINAL.pdf [hereinafter "General Secretariat Report"].
199 Associated Press, U.S. lawmakers says deportees not fueling crime in Haiti,
HAITI NEWS, Dec. 11, 2006, available at http://haitinews.wordpress.com/2006/12/
13/us-lawmaker-says-deportees-not-fueling-crime-in-haiti/.
200 Id.
201 Amy Bracken, Influx of Deportees Stirs Anger in Haiti: Some Believe US
Policy Helped Boost Crime Rate, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 11, 2007, at A6, availa-
ble at http://www.boston.com/news/world/latinamerica/articles/ 2007/03/11/influx_
ofdeportees-stirs-anger-inhaiti/?page= full.
202 Auguste v. Ridge, 395 F.3d 123, 154 (3d Cir. 2005).
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"with the intent to inflict severe pain and suffering"203 due to
the widespread hatred of Haitian criminal deportees. Thus,
Haitian prison conditions satisfy the regulatory definition of
"torture" for claims of withholding of removal under the CAT.
The new facts set forth above also make clear that the policy of
indefinite detention is not merely a "preventative measure to
prevent returning criminals from further exacerbating the
country's already high levels of crime; '20 4 neither are they to
"deter criminal activity in Haiti." These facts also contravene
the Third Circuit's conclusion that CAT claims by Haitian crim-
inal deportees are merely bemoaning ... "the general state of
affairs that constitute[s] conditions of confinement' in Haiti."20 5
Rather, these policies, intended to punish, intimidate, and co-
erce criminal deportees, 206 were crafted specifically to target
criminal deportees from the United States. This fact belies any
assertion that pain and suffering will not be "directed at 'a par-
ticular petitioner."' 207 Finally, even if non-criminal deportees
suffer in the same prison conditions as criminal deportees, or
Haitian authorities do not create or maintain the entire prison
system for the purpose of torturing criminal deportees, the spe-
cific intent standard is still met because the policies which keep
criminal deportees in inhumane conditions for unreasonably
long periods of time were created specifically to cause severe
pain and suffering to criminal deportees.
CONCLUSION
While some courts have interpreted the "intentionally in-
flicted" requirement of 8 C.F.R. § 208.18 8(a)(1) to impose a spe-
cific intent standard, general intent should satisfy the
"intentionally inflicted" requirement of 8 C.F.R. § 208.18 8(a)(1)
for several reasons. First, the requisite intent was meant to ex-
clude from the regulatory definition of torture deliberate acts
that resulted in unanticipated or unintended pain and suffer-
ing. A general intent standard would effectively serve that pur-
203 Id.
204 Francois v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 645, 650 (3d Cir. 2006).
205 Toissaint v. Att'y Gen. of the United States, 455 F.3d 409, 416 (3d Cir.
2006) (quoting Auguste, 395 F.3d at 137).
206 In re J-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 291, 298 (BIA 2002).
207 Toissaint, 455 F.3d at 416 (quoting Francois, 448 F.3d at 652).
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pose, while a specific intent standard will exclude even those
deliberate acts committed by persecutors who foresee that their
acts will result in torture. Second, a specific intent standard
would disqualify almost every applicant 208 because any innocu-
ous explanation for torture removes the conduct from the regu-
latory definition of torture.
Even if courts determine that the regulations require a spe-
cific intent standard, the courts should not apply it to Haitian
deportees using the analytical framework the Court used in Au-
guste and In re J-E-. Rather, the courts should afford the peti-
tioner with a rebuttable presumption that the persecutor
intends the natural and probable consequences of the persecu-
tor's actions, and the courts should analyze the Haitian prison
system as a whole.
Finally, the Haitian policies and nation-wide hostility to-
wards criminal deportees demonstrate that under either the
general intent standard or the specific intent standard, criminal
deportees to Haiti will experience torture if returned to Haiti.
Accordingly, they are eligible for Withholding of Removal under
the Convention against Torture.
ADDENDUM
Just before the printing of this article, the Second and Elev-
enth Circuit Courts of Appeal decided cases in which the poten-
tial deportees suffered from some physical or mental
infirmity. 20 9 However, rather than relying on the willful blind-
ness rationale in Lavira, the courts reasoned that the specific
intent standard could be met if there were sufficient evidence to
show that the applicant's condition would cause the applicant to
act inappropriately resulting in their being singled out for spe-
208 In re J-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 310-11.
I take issue with [the majority's approach], which I fear can only lead to a deroga-
tion and not a meaningful implementation of our obligations under the Convention
Against Torture. Considering the limitations adopted by the majority in this case,
I find it difficult to conceive of the circumstances in which an individual might
qualify for our protection, as there will always be some basis for disqualification.
Id. See also Zubeda v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 463 (3d Cir. 2003) (stating "Moreover,
requiring an alien to establish the specific intent of his/her persecutors could im-
pose insurmountable obstacles to affording the very protections the community of
nations sought to guarantee under the Convention Against Torture.").
209 See Pierre v. Gonzales 502 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 2007); Jean-Pierre v. U.S. At-
torney General 500 F.3d 1315 (11th Cir. 2007).
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cial abuse by prison guards. 210 Indeed, the Second Circuit ex-
plicitly repudiated the reasoning in Lavira, stating, "[we do not
see how these concepts [in Lavira], which may bear on knowl-
edge to the extent they establish conscious avoidance, can with-
out more demonstrate specific intent, which requires that the
actor intend the actual consequences of his conduct (as distin-
guished from the act that causes these consequences." 211 While
these cases hold much promise for sick or disabled applicants,
they fail to address two important issues. First, the Courts
have still not reconciled its specific standard with the tradi-
tional criminal intent standard. 212 Second, the Courts have ig-
nored the evidence that American criminal deportees are
consistently singled out. The Eleventh Circuit even cited the
expert testimony of Michelle Karshan, stating that "[c]riminal
deportees from the United States are treated especially harshly,
and that they are sometimes 'beaten with metal wands because
the prison guards perceive them to be professional criminals de-
serving of the punishment.' 2 1 3
210 Pierre, 502 F.3d at 122; Jean-Pierre 500 F.3d at 1323.
211 Pierre, 502 F.3d at 118.
212 See supra Part VI.A.2.
213 See Jean-Pierre, 500 F.3d at 1319.
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